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Among the many important questions highlighted by recent events in the
￿nancial sector, one concerns the features and determinants of the liability
side of households￿balance sheets, and a second concerns the measurement
of household creditworthiness. Had households taken on and accumulated
debt with more wisdom and caution, and had lenders obtained and relied on
more meaningful measures of creditworthiness, foreclosure rates might now
be more moderate.
Using a unique dataset matched at the individual level from two ad-
ministrative sources, we examine household choices between liabilities and
assess the informational content of prime and subprime credit scores in the
consumer credit market. (In abbreviated fashion, we aspire to follow the
similar inquiries of Adams, Einav and Levin (forthcoming) in the auto mar-
ket context.) First, more speci￿cally, we assess consumers￿e⁄ectiveness at
prioritizing use of their lowest-cost credit option, while (Agarwal, Chom-
sisengphet, Liu and Souleles 2007b) examine the choice between two di⁄erent
credit card contracts with di⁄erent costs, here we ￿nd that most borrowers
from one payday lender who also have a credit card from a major credit
card issuer have substantial credit card liquidity on the days they take out
their payday loans.1 This is costly because payday loans have annualized
￿Agarwal: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 230 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illi-
nois 60604-1413, ushakri@yahoo.com. Skiba: Vanderbilt University Law School, 131 21st
Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203-1181, paige.skiba@vanderbilt.edu. Tobacman: Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania and NBER, 3620 Locust Walk, 1459 SHDH, Philadelphia, PA
19104-6372, tobacman@wharton.upenn.edu. We would like to thank David Abrams, Ste-
fano DellaVigna, Jonathan Levin, Devin Pope, Nicholas Souleles, and Maisy Wong for very
valuable comments and advice. JEL Codes: D14 (Personal Finance), D91 (Intertemporal
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1The term ￿payday loan￿is used because these loans provide liquidity between paydays.
The typical loan is due on the borrower￿ s next payday, and hence has a duration of between
1interest rates of at least several hundred percent, though perhaps partly
explained by the fact that borrowers have experienced substantial declines
in credit card liquidity in the year leading up to the payday loan. Second,
we explore the relationship between prime and subprime credit scoring. In
this we follow (Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu and Souleles 2007a), who use
a dataset combining all the credit relationships held by a sample of bank
customers, to explore the relative value of di⁄erent sorts of information in
predicting consumer default on a given product, including outside credit
bureau information and FICO scores, internal information from the bank￿ s
behavior scores for the individual product, and ￿relationship￿information
from the behavior of the other products held by the customer. Here we
use our matched sample of credit cards and payday loans, from which we
observe FICO scores and scores from the subprime credit bureau Teletrack.
This payday lender only used Teletrack scores to make loan approval de-
cisions for ￿rst-time applicants, though conditional on the Teletrack score
higher FICO scores predict higher repayment rates by economically and
statistically signi￿cant amounts. We show that the two scores have inde-
pendent information and are specialized for the types of lending where they
are used: Teletrack scores have eight times the predictive power for pay-
day loan default as FICO scores. We also show that prime lenders should
value information about their borrowers￿subprime activity. Taking out a
payday loan predicts nearly a doubling in the probability of serious credit
card delinquency over the next year. The rest of the paper explains how we
arrive at these facts and discusses the extent to which they present puzzles
for standard models.
1 Merged Administrative Datasets
Our analysis takes advantage of an unusual, individual-level match of two
administrative data sources. Speci￿cally, we have used individual identi-
￿ers to merge loan records from a large payday lender with transaction and
credit histories from a ￿nancial institution that o⁄ers checking accounts,
credit cards, mortgages, home-equity lines of credit, and auto ￿nancing.
For detailed description of the two datasets, we refer readers to sources
that have used them separately in the past (Agarwal, Driscol, Gabaix and
Laibson 2008, Skiba and Tobacman 2008a, e.g.). Online Appendix Tables
A1 and A2 respectively summarize characteristics of the individuals and ac-
counts in what we￿ ll refer to here as the payday lender and credit card issuer
one week and one month (Caskey 1994, Stegman 2007).
2panels. In all that follows, we include the 102,779 people who borrowed on
a payday loan from this payday lender (i.e., we exclude unsuccessful payday
loan applicants) and had a full set of background variables, and the 143,228
people with credit card accounts at the credit card issuer in the states where
the payday lender operates.
Tables A1 and A2 also report information about the matched sample
of 3090 people, and this selected group is statistically di⁄erent from both
the full credit card issuer population and the full payday lender population
on most measures.2 Payday borrowers￿average incomes are much lower,
though the variation in their incomes is also much lower. Their accounts are
older, and their credit lines smaller. Intriguingly, the income data from the
credit card issuer for the matched sample are higher by 50 percent than the
income data from the payday lender for the matched sample. The number of
open credit card accounts with balances is almost identical, as is the amount
of outstanding credit card debt. Home equity line and mortgage balances
are also similar.
One important measure on which the matched sample di⁄ers less than
we expected is the FICO score. Among all credit card account holders the
average FICO score is 730, with a standard deviation of 69, compared to 673
for the matched sample. The standard deviation for the matched sample is
slightly smaller than for the full credit card population. Conventionally, the
subprime population is viewed as having scores below 620, implying that
a large share of payday borrowers likely have continuing access to prime
credit. In the data, FICO scores are current as of the previous month.
Below we focus on questions that are of interest within the selected
matched sample, and we analyze the causes and aftermath of the selection
itself.
2 Liquidity￿ s Decline
Using this matched dataset, we ￿rst examine how e⁄ectively consumers
choose between payday loans and credit cards. One summary measure sug-
gests a common pecuniary mistake: two-thirds of the matched sample has
2Out of the entire Texas population of roughly 20 million, the overall (non-random)
payday loan coverage rate is about three-quarters of one percent. The credit card issuer
panel includes 23,795 Texas-based accounts. Thus if the payday loan and credit card
samples were orthogonal we would expect to obtain only 180 matches, while we actually
have 1707 Texas-based matches out of the 3090 matches overall. Presumably much of the
di⁄erence arises because only adults can borrow on credit cards and payday loans, and
because both products attract people who seek credit.
3at least $1000 of credit card liquidity on the day they take their ￿rst pay-
day loans, much more than the typical $300 payday loan. For a two-week
payday loan with a ￿nance charge of 18 percent, using credit card liquidity






= $52; if the
credit card APR is 18 percent. Appendix Table A3 elaborates on how credit
card liquidity and APRs vary across the population on the days people take
their payday loans. Most notably, liquidity is strongly increasing in credit
scores; married credit card account holders had almost twice the liquidity
of singles; and credit card liquidity was much higher for the elderly. Across
these distributions, most people in the matched sample appear to have credit
card liquidity exceeding the size of the typical payday loan.
Since many payday borrowers take loans repeatedly, we also construct
a measure called LOSS that cumulates interest losses over the one year
beginning with each borrower￿ s ￿rst payday loan. Speci￿cally, for the i￿ th
person in the matched dataset, we compute LOSSi as follows. Suppose
individual i takes ni payday loans within a year of her ￿rst loan, including
her ￿rst loan, on dates fdi1;di2;:::;dinig; where di1 = 0 and dini ￿ 365
8i. Denote the size of i￿ s k￿ th payday loan by bi (dik); the length or term
of that loan in days by ti (dik); available credit card liquidity on the date
of i￿ s k￿ th loan by li (dik); and ￿ {￿ s prevailing credit card gross APR on
the same date by Rcc
i (dik): Finance charges are ￿xed for payday loans at
rpdl = 18 percent.3 Then LOSSi =
P ni








Figure 1 plots the histogram of LOSS, including the share of credit card
customers who have LOSS = 0 because they have no credit card liquidity
when they borrow from the payday lender. Typical credit card account
holders would have saved almost $200 by borrowing up to their credit card
limits before turning to payday loans.4
A number of other authors including Gross and Souleles (2002), Bertaut
and Haliassos (forthcoming), and Agarwal et al. (2007b) have measured
similar liquid debt ￿puzzles￿using other data. Consensus is elusive, but the
size of the interest losses found elsewhere (with more representative samples)
tends to be smaller on average than what we measure. Telyukova and Wright
(2008) further explore liquidity needs as an explanation for the credit card
3To emphasize again, this is a per-loan proportional charge, not an APR.
4Appendix Table A4 shows the impact of demographic variables on LOSS. Our results
suggest that losses decline with income and credit risk characteristics. Additionally they
are higher for married couples. One potential explanation is that married couples are
more likely to seek payday loans to hide expenditures from their spouse.
4debt puzzle. The current paper￿ s results are notable because (i) the interest
losses are shown to be very large, (ii) since the individuals in our matched
dataset might borrow on payday loans elsewhere and might have access to
other sources of liquidity, we believe we￿ re measuring a lower bound on the
actual interest losses, and (iii) over ten million US households borrow on
payday loans each year.
Our ￿ndings complement existing research on the causes of payday bor-
rowing patterns (Caskey 1994, Skiba and Tobacman 2008b, e.g.) and survey
evidence about the alternatives available to payday borrowers. Regarding
the latter, a nationally representative sample of one thousand payday loan
customers, surveyed by Elliehausen and Lawrence (2001), found 56.5 percent
of respondents in possession of bank-issued credit cards. However, of the
individuals with cards 61 percent hadn￿ t used them in the past year in order
to avoid exceeding the cards￿credit limits. A collection of other representa-
tive surveys across six states conducted by IoData (2002) and covering 2600
payday borrowers found 55 percent in possession of credit cards. Again, ac-
cess to liquidity for these respondents might nonetheless have been limited,
as only 34 percent ￿almost always￿or ￿sometimes￿paid monthly credit card
balances in full. Across these surveys, the anticipation of rejection caused
two-thirds of respondents not to apply for credit on at least one occasion in
the past ￿ve years.
Table 1 presents information about the path that credit card liquidity
takes during the year leading up to a customer￿ s ￿rst payday loan. Several
features of the data are apparent in Table 1. First, credit card liquidity falls
by $545 over the previous year on average, an amount that is much larger
than the average $300 size of a ￿rst-time payday borrower￿ s loan. Second,
most of the deterioration in liquidity happens in the ￿ve months before the
payday loan is taken. This is interesting because it speaks to the question of
why people borrow on payday loans. If liquidity were ￿ at until a large drop
one month before the payday loan application, we would suspect that a sin-
gle large bad shock had unexpectedly arrived. Since we ￿nd average liquidity
falling steadily, impatience, general ￿nancial mismanagement, or persistent
shocks seem more likely explanations. Third, deterioration happens across
the distribution of credit card liquidity, and the standard deviation falls sub-
stantially. However, fourth, combined with the declines in liquidity across
the board, there is substantial heterogeneity. The people at the top (with
the most liquidity) don￿ t decline very fast; the people at the bottom have
little further to descend; and the upper-middle group collapses. These num-
bers o⁄er some insight into how households￿cash ￿ ow can evolve, as well as
illustrating the process of selection from the full credit card population into
5the matched sample.
3 Information from Prime and Subprime Credit
Scores
By examining the separate and combined predictive power of the FICO
and Teletrack scores for the matched sample, which is publically available
to ￿rms, higher-quality information may emerge for lenders. The correla-
tion coe¢ cient between the FICO and Teletrack scores within the matched
sample is 0.2555, implying substantial di⁄erences between the two scores,
presumably because Teletrack scores emphasize information from subprime
lenders (including car title lenders and rent-to-own establishments, in ad-
dition to payday lenders). In a prior study, Agarwal et al. (2007a) study
the impact of relationships a credit card holder has with her bank (deposits,
loans, and investments) on credit card defaults. They ￿nd that privately
available information about deposit, loan and investment accounts is highly
predictive of credit card defaults.
In Appendix Tables A5-A6 we report estimates from a series of re-
gressions. The ￿rst series examines what the credit card variables predict
about payday loan sizes and payday loan default. The payday loan default
(logit) regression illustrates new and valuable information about the rela-
tive value of prime and subprime credit scores. The FICO score￿ s coe¢ cient
is very large in absolute value, with a t-stat of 15 and a 1sd increase pre-
dicting a default probability that is lower by 7.6 percentage points. This
makes it somewhat puzzling FICO is not used to evaluate payday loan
applications. However, the coe¢ cient we ￿nd on the Teletrack score is
(￿0:0601= ￿ 0:0270) = 2:23 times the magnitude of the coe¢ cient on the
FICO score, and (as reported in Table A1) the standard deviation of Tele-
track scores is 4.18 times as large as the standard deviation of the FICO score
in the matched sample. Thus the Teletrack score has more than eight times
as much power for predicting payday loan default as FICO does, suggesting
why payday lenders might prioritize Teletrack scores over FICO scores in
making lending decisions.
Table A6 focuses on the question of what the payday loan variables pre-
dict about credit card usage and default. Usage is de￿ned here as outstand-
ing debt divided by the limit. The most important result speaks to the value
credit card companies might place on knowledge that an account holder had
taken out a payday loan. De￿ne ￿serious￿ credit card delinquency as an
indicator for whether an account becomes 90 days past due (90dpd) at any
6point during the following year. Then a logit of 90dpd on credit card control
variables and an indicator for whether or not a payday loan is taken implies
that taking a payday loan predicts a 92 percent higher serious delinquency
rate. Overall in the credit card issuer data, the annual serious delinquency
rate is 6 percent, so we are ￿nding an increase of about 5.5 percentage points
in this rate. Selection issues have been discussed above, but a credit card
lender might well be more interested in the joint implication of the treat-
ment (the payday loan) and the selection (that the account holder is looking
for very expensive credit).
Because we don￿ t observe borrowing at other payday lenders, our esti-
mate is a lower bound on the true predicted increase in credit card default
risk following a borrower￿ s initial payday loan. These ￿ndings suggest credit
card issuers might ￿nd information about account holders￿payday borrow-
ing very valuable, insofar as it provides su¢ cient advance warning to limit
or rein in credit. We are left with two possible puzzles: why do payday
lenders generally use only Teletrack scores and not also FICO scores when
making lending decisions, and why do credit card issuers not aggressively
seek information about payday borrowing by their customers?
4 Conclusion
This paper identi￿es and discusses possible liquidity and credit scoring puz-
zles. Regarding liquidity, we ￿nd that most account holders with a major
credit card issuer have substantial unused liquidity on their credit cards at
the time they borrow on payday loans. Their annual pecuniary losses from
payday borrowing, compared to using their credit cards, are large compared
to previously identi￿ed liquid debt puzzles. Regarding credit scores, payday
lenders could obtain useful information about default probabilities by ex-
amining the FICO scores of applicants in addition to Teletrack scores, and
credit card issuers would bene￿t from having frequently-updated informa-
tion about whether their account holders are payday borrowers.
We conjecture that small costs could at least begin to explain these phe-
nomena. Credit bureaus charge lenders small fees for each score query, and
those fees might exceed the value of the marginal creditworthiness infor-
mation obtained. On the consumer side, Zinman (2009) and Borzekowski
and Kiser (2008) discuss models of account-speci￿c characteristics that can
incorporate the realistic variety of pecuniary, non-pecuniary, and cognitive
costs. They point in promising directions for explaining this paper￿ s new
facts.
7References
Adams, William, Liran Einav, and Jonathan Levin, ￿Liquidity Con-
straints and Imperfect Information in Subprime Lending,￿ American
Economic Review, forthcoming.
Agarwal, Sumit, John Driscol, Xavier Gabaix, and David Laib-
son, ￿Learning in the Credit Card Market,￿ 2008. Available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1091623.
, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Chunlin Liu, and Nicholas Soule-
les, ￿Bene￿ts of Relationship Lending: Evidence from the Consumer
Credit Market,￿2007. Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
, , , and , ￿Do Consumers Choose the Right Credit Con-
tracts?,￿2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=843826.
Bertaut, Carol and Michael Haliassos, ￿Debt Revolvers for Self Con-
trol,￿Review of Finance, forthcoming. University of Cyprus mimeo.
Borzekowski, Ron and Elizabeth Kiser, ￿The Choice at Check-
out: Quantifying Demand Across Payment Instruments,￿International
Journal of Industrial Organization, July 2008, 26, 889￿ 902.
Caskey, John P., Fringe Banking: Check-Cashing Outlets, Pawnshops,
and the Poor, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1994.
Elliehausen, Gregory and Edward C. Lawrence, Payday Advance
Credit in America: An Analysis of Customer Demand, Credit Research
Center, Georgetown University, 2001.
Gross, David and Nicholas Souleles, ￿Do Liquidity Constraints and
Interest Rates Matter for Consumer Behavior? Evidence from Credit
Card Data,￿Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2002, 117 (1),
149￿ 185.
IoData, ￿Payday Advance Customer Research: Cumulative State Research
Report,￿September 2002.
Skiba, Paige Marta and Jeremy Tobacman, ￿Do Payday Loans Cause
Bankruptcy?,￿2008. University of Pennsylvania mimeo.
and , ￿Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and Discounting: Explaining
Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment and Default,￿2008. University of
Pennsylvania mimeo.
8Stegman, Michael, ￿Payday Lending,￿Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Winter 2007, 21 (1), 169￿ 190.
Telyukova, Irina and Randall Wright, ￿A Model of Money and Credit,
with Application to the Credit Card Debt Puzzle,￿Review of Economic
Studies, 2008, 75 (2), 629￿ 647.
Zinman, Jonathan, ￿Debit or Credit?,￿ Journal of Bank-
ing and Finance, February 2009, 33 (2), 358￿ 366.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbank￿n.2008.08.009.
9 















t90th 75th 25th 10th Mean Std
t-12 2557 2018 1069 478 1556 1036
t-11 2581 2086 1070 440 1572 1171
t-10 2531 2091 1118 395 1587 991
t-9 2587 1841 1023 382 1413 1205
t-8 2451 1739 867 357 1595 1104
t-7 2460 1643 867 346 1421 1148
t-6 2509 1585 804 334 1380 1118
t-5 2319 1585 793 311 1396 899
t-4 2348 1375 711 282 1284 842
t-3 2280 1395 663 287 1249 818
t-2 2171 1390 664 265 1122 722
t-1 2177 1359 623 262 990 677
t 2102 1244 583 263 1011 653
Table 1
Liquidity Declines as the Payday Borrowing Event Approaches
Liquidity Percentiles ($) Lag Time Before 
the PDL (Months)
Liquidity ($)Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Overall Characteristics
Fico Score 729.57 69.20 673.44 67.61
Income 62258.29 244547.48 34115.48 100286.85
Number of CC Accounts 25.76 11.60 22.51 11.86
Open CC Accounts 3.67 3.41 3.19 3.01
Open CC with balance 2.14 2.37 2.63 2.50
Total Balance of CC 6625.79 11640.12 10917.41 15355.09
% Delinquent 5.45% 77.26% 13.85% 56.05%
Issuer's Credit Card
Account Age (months) 93.33 81.44 62.27 54.26
Behavior Score 593.55 262.08 545.62 288.66
Credit Line 7521.94 3665.30 3240.29 3652.78
Current Balance 2968.02 2992.54 2479.44 2796.09
Chargeoff Amount 4867.48 3817.89 3773.32 3588.47
Purchases 256.42 744.62 240.49 75181.91
Number of Monthly Purchases 2.01 3.30 1.85 3.54
APR 17.57 5.71 18.23 6.37
Cycle Payments 319.94 864.28 209.79 644.13
Monthly Payments 340.08 908.27 343.59 96191.91
Debt 1933.10 2840.80 2120.30 3218.55
Cycle Cash Withdrawl 10.13 144.38 3.91 64.60
Cycle Purchases 259.01 749.69 146.78 510.37
Other Accounts with this Issuer
Home Equity Balance 2531.58 12620.68 1669.09 7586.31
Mortgage Balance 43849.55 87776.67 31585.94 71495.08
Auto Balance 3944.08 7335.66 2632.25 8369.89
Demographics
Female Applicant 30% 31% 18% 38%
Co-Applicant 11% 32% 22% 41%
Singles 32% 47% 33% 47%
Age 51.06 16.97 50.78 14.34
Number of Accounts 143,228 3090
Unmatched Sample Matched Sample
Appendix Table A1

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eA:  FICO Ranges Variables Mean Std N
<500 liquidity -554.45 701.95 41
apr 24.48 3.22 41
500-550 liquidity -356.49 927.11 93
apr 23.66 5.43 93
550-600 liquidity 496.27 1698.95 216
apr 21.32 7.37 216
600-650 liquidity 711.81 2967.09 834
apr 20.39 6.95 834
650-700 liquidity 1099.00 3281.15 1153
apr 17.53 6.23 1153
>700 liquidity 2050.20 3797.71 753
apr 15.02 5.85 753
B:  Revolvers/Transactors
Debt Revolvers liquidity 613.93 3082.05 2264
apr 19.05 6.71 2264
Transactors liquidity 2498.54 3604.64 826
apr 16.01 5.33 826
C:  Single/Married
Married liquidity 1315.66 2277.76 2069
apr 18.24 6.32 2069
Single liquidity 720.11 3006.74 1021
apr 18.20 6.49 1021
D:  Age Range
<30 liquidity 1091.01 4034.30 272
apr 18.79 6.30 272
30-40 liquidity 976.99 4189.46 535
apr 18.45 6.47 535
40-50 liquidity 896.28 4154.83 856
apr 17.95 6.61 856
50-60 liquidity 963.12 4466.89 802
apr 17.99 6.16 802
60-70 liquidity 1497.23 3908.58 334
apr 18.42 6.45 334
>70 liquidity 2048.72 3585.83 291
apr 18.53 5.85 291
Appendix Table A3
Credit Card Liquidity and APRs in the Matched Sample
Notes:  Calculated by the authors from matched administrative data.  "Liquidity" 
refers to credit card liquidity on the days individuals take out their first payday 
loans.  Liquidity is calculated as the difference between the credit limit on the 
credit card and the amount of outstanding debt.  The APR is the average over 
accounts within the group and is not debt weighted.  "Transactors" are defined as 
credit card account holders who paid their credit card bills in full in the one month 
before taking out their first payday loans. Note that each partition contains the 
total of 3090 people in the matched sample.Variables Coeff Value Std Err t-stat
Constant 133.71 26.91 4.97
Ln(Income) (at T=1) -1.55 0.35 -4.41
Gender (Female) -7.03 6.90 -1.02
 Marital Status 17.41 5.69 3.06
Age -3.18 0.70 -4.52
Age Sq 5.13 0.92 5.59
FICO Scores (at T=1) -0.99 0.07 -13.39
Fico Score Sq (at T=1) -0.29 0.09 -3.29
Number of Obs 3090
R Sq 0.08
Appendix Table A4
Correlates of Interest Losses
This Table reports the results of regressing LOSS on 
individual characteristics at the date of the credit card 
account holder's first payday loan.V
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